Document Theft - IRM as a Last Line of Defense
By Martin Abrahams-Oracle on Aug 01, 2011
I haven't had much time to update the blog recently, but just time to post before going on holiday. Over recent weeks there have been numerous stories relating to document theft – the Pentagon commentary on systematic theft of thousands of documents from defense contractors, the reports of journalists hacking into not just phones but the email systems of public and private citizens, the smug announcements by “cyber terrorists” that they’ve stolen files from various organisations.
The relevance of IRM is clear. Protect your perimeter, your applications, your file systems and repositories, of course, but protect your sensitive documents too. In the end, there are so many ways to gain digital possession of documents – but only one way to actually make use of them if they are protected by IRM. Anyone stealing a sealed document by whatever means has another substantial line of defense to overcome.
And that line of defense is designed to audit and authenticate access attempts as well as consider a number of other risk factors. It can also be rapidly reconfigured to deny access completely in the event of calamity – a single rule change can prevent all access from compromised user accounts or for whole classifications of information. The audit trail can also provide valuable clues as to the source of the attack.
In a cloudy world, where perimeters are of diminishing relevance, you need to apply controls to the assets themselves. And the scalable, manageable, intuitive way to achieve that control is Oracle IRM.