Clouds Leak - IRM protects
By Martin Abrahams-Oracle on Jun 11, 2011
In a recent report, security professionals reported two leading fears relating to cloud services:
"Exposure of confidential or sensitive information to unauthorised systems or personnel"
"Confidential or sensitive data loss or leakage"
These fears are compounded by the fact that business users frequently sign themselves up to cloud services independently of whatever arrangements are made by corporate IT. Users are making personal choices to use the cloud as a convenient place to store and share files - and they are doing this for business information as well as personal files. In my own role, I was recently invited by a partner to review a sensitive business document using Googledocs. I just checked, and the file is still there weeks after the end of that particular project - because users don't often tidy up after themselves.
So, the cloud gives us new, seductively simple ways to scatter information around, and our choices are governed by convenience rather than compliance. And not all cloud services are equal when it comes to protecting data. Only a few weeks ago, it was reported that one popular service had amended its privacy assurance from "Nobody can see your private files..." to "Other [service] users cannot...", and that administrators were "prohibited" from accessing files - rather than "prevented". This story demonstrates that security pros are right to worry about exposure to unauthorised systems and personnel.
Added to this, the recent Sony incident highlights how lazy we are when picking passwords, and that services do not always protect passwords anything like as well as they should. Reportedly millions of passwords were stored as plain text, and analysis shows that users favoured very simple passwords, and used the same password for multiple services. No great surprise, but worrying to a security professional who knows that users are just as inconsiderate when using the cloud for collaboration.
No wonder then that security professionals put the loss or exposure of sensitive information firmly at the top of their list of concerns. They are faced with a triple-whammy - distribution without control, administration with inadequate safeguards, and authentication with weak password policy. A compliance nightmare.
So why not block users from using such services? Well, you can try, but from the users' perspective convenience out-trumps compliance and where there's a will there's a way. Blocking technologies find it really difficult to cover all the options, and users can be very inventive at bypassing blocks. In any case, users are making these choices because it makes them more productive, so the real goal, arguably, is to find a safe way to let people make these choices rather than maintain the pretence that you can stop them.
The relevance of IRM is clear. Users might adopt such services, but sealed files remain encrypted no matter where they are stored and no matter what mechanism is used to upload and download them. Cloud administrators have no more access to them than if they found them on a lost USB device. Further, a hacker might steal or crack your cloud passwords, but that has no bearing on your IRM service password, which is firmly under the control of corporate policy. And if policy changes such that the users no longer have rights to the files they uploaded, those files become inaccessible to them regardless of location. You can tidy up even if users do not.
Finally, the IRM audit trail can give insights into the locations where files are being stored.
So, IRM provides an effective safety net for your sensitive corporate information - an enabler that mitigates risks that are otherwise really hard to deal with.