By MortazaviBlog on Dec 23, 2006
Here is another academic presentation from my Haas years. It describes "Multi-Lot Auction Design: Applied to 3G Spectrum Auctions." I hope you can follow it. Like the previous paper I just posted, it needs some editing and work to bring it up to par. It is definitely worth a separate paper of its own if only time would allow.
Put together originally as a presentation for a game theory seminar, it distinguishes auctions involving multiple lots (items) of potentially complementary value from auctions involving identical lots (items). An example would be if you would participate in an auction involving pieces of adjacent properties of various sizes as opposed to auctions involving instances of the same object. Another example of the first kind, discussed in this paper, are spectrum auctions because these auctions are national and span multiple, but separate, municipalities and regions with value complementarities having to do with costs of maintaining a mobile network on a particular topography of auction licenses.