Sunday Oct 15, 2006

Credible Commitments vs. Credible Threats

As part of my interest in transaction cost economics, I've also been fascinated by the follies and excesses of modern strategy theory which focuses, almost exclusively, on a view of economic and social relationships based on anti-social power differentials as opposed to social interdependencies.

Here, I'm posting an essay (PDF) I wrote in May of 2003 on the concept of "credible commitments" in contrast to the-so-called "credible threats." The former concept has been used by prominent transaction cost economists while the latter remains a part of the common terminology in much of game theory.

(Again, anyone may use the essay  as long as the user provides appropriate reference to its origin and author.)
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