Credible Commitments vs. Credible Threats

As part of my interest in transaction cost economics, I've also been fascinated by the follies and excesses of modern strategy theory which focuses, almost exclusively, on a view of economic and social relationships based on anti-social power differentials as opposed to social interdependencies.

Here, I'm posting an essay (PDF) I wrote in May of 2003 on the concept of "credible commitments" in contrast to the-so-called "credible threats." The former concept has been used by prominent transaction cost economists while the latter remains a part of the common terminology in much of game theory.

(Again, anyone may use the essay  as long as the user provides appropriate reference to its origin and author.)
Comments:

Hi Max - any chance you could post your essay in PDF format rather than .doc ?

Posted by Jonathan Bruce on October 16, 2006 at 11:13 AM PDT #

Hi Jonathan - Good point and good to hear from you. I posted it in the original format. I will see if I can produce PDF tonight and post it. (On my iMac at home, I don't have an official version of Open Office. Only a beta version of NeoOffice. I'm assuming it has the PDF convertor.)

Posted by M. Mortazavi on October 16, 2006 at 11:39 AM PDT #

Hi Max, Ah, I see you're working on the PDF. I'm just an econ buff and would like to read this too. PM

Posted by Peter McCormick on October 17, 2006 at 02:01 AM PDT #

PDF version posted.

Posted by M. Mortazavi on October 17, 2006 at 05:17 AM PDT #

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